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This article addresses the problem of incompetent representation by
defense counsel in international criminal tribunals. According to the
author, the ineffectiveness of a particular attorney may be attributa-
ble to a number offactors, including a lack of experience with inter-
national criminal law, unfamiliarity with the procedures of interna-
tional criminal tribunals, and the simple failure to be fluent in the
languages used by the court. Starr explains that the problem of in-
competence persists because of obstacles to the recruitment, reten-
tion, and appointment of proficient defense lawyers, as well as the
lack of administrative or judicial oversight concerning competence.
The author points out the shortcomings of solutions that have al-
ready been suggested by scholars and advocates, such as establish-
ing associations of counsel or creating an Office of the Defender
within the tribunal. Finally, Starr sets forth a new method by which
the International Criminal Court can hopefully avoid the incompe-
tence problem that has plagued its predecessors. The author's pro-
posed solution incorporates expanded recruiting practices, intensive
training programs, and a more selective appointment process.
Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks very much to Julian Davis
Mortenson and Jenia lontcheva Turner for comments on drafts; to symposium participants,
students in my International Criminal Law class at Michigan, and participants in the Universi-
ty of Maryland Junior Faculty Workshop for their feedback; and to Alyssa Mayer for her re-
search assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The modem international criminal tribunals have devoted considerable
efforts to providing fair trials to the accused-indeed, procedural fairness
has often been described as the overriding objective of the tribunals.' Yet
the tribunals have been surprisingly tolerant of one widely recognized ob-
stacle to the achievement of that objective: the incompetence 2 of a number of
1 See, e.g., Mark S. Ellis, The Evolution of Defense Counsel Appearing Before the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 949, 949 (2003)
(quoting Richard J. Goldstone, Address before The Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
CEELI Leadership Award Dinner (Oct. 2, 1996)) ("[History will judge the Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on the fairness or unfairness of their proceedings.").
2 1 use the term "incompetence" as shorthand to refer to various shortcomings in skills that
impair counsel's abilities to provide effective defense in the context of international criminal
tribunals specifically. I do not mean to suggest that such counsel are not capable lawyers in
their home legal systems, nor that they could not become capable, with adequate training, of
providing effective assistance at the international level. The proposals I make below include
a training component that is designed in part to improve the competence of existing counsel.
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appointed defense counsel.' Some defendants certainly have been
represented well or even excellently. But others have not been so lucky. A
number of problems have been pointed out by the tribunals themselves in
decisions criticizing submissions of counsel. For instance, the tribunals have
often described defense submissions as incoherent or incomprehensible, or
deemed them too unclear to merit consideration.4  Moreover, the tribunals
have frequently observed that counsel have failed to raise potentially valid
objections or arguments at the proper time,5 and simultaneously often chas-
tised counsel for raising frivolous motions and arguments.6 In many cases,
such problems result from inexperience: many counsel have little or no expe-
rience with criminal law, much less international criminal law. Other coun-
Defense counsel are appointed for indigent defendants. Because of the enormous cost of
defense at the international level, nearly every defendant qualifies for appointed defense
counsel, even though many defendants are not poor in absolute terms. See Ellis, supra note 1,
at 972 (noting that as of 2003, over 90% of defendants at the ICTY had been represented by
appointed counsel).
4 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, ICTR-01-64-A, Decision on the Appellant's Rule 115
Motion and Related Motion by the Prosecution, 3 (Oct. 21, 2005) (refusing to consider de-
fense submission on the ground that it was "incoherent"); Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29-A,
Decision on the First and Third Rule 115 Defence Motions to Present Additional Evidence
Before the Appeals Chamber, 1 21 nn.62-63 (June 30, 2005) (noting that the Chamber "failed
to understand" certain defense submissions and that it "struggled to understand the [defen-
dant's] language, logic, and arguments"); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-
10-A, Judgment, TT 333-334 (Dec. 13, 2004) (rejecting defense argument for lack of clarity);
Semanza v. Prosecutor, ICTR-97-20-A, Decision on Defence Objections to the Prosecution's
Notice of Appeal (July 25, 2003) (describing defense arguments as "incomprehensible" and
"patently misleading"). In citing examples from the case law here and below, I do not mean
to suggest that the Tribunals' criticisms of counsels' arguments are necessarily always accu-
rate; still, it is counsels' responsibility to make arguments clear to the judges, so frequent
judicial complaints about clarity are indicative that a significant effectiveness problem likely
exists. Moreover, because of the generally collegial culture of the Tribunals (and perhaps to
avoid embarrassing the Tribunal by publicly acknowledging incompetence), judicial criti-
cisms of counsel may often actually be understated.
5 See infra note 78 (citing appellate cases dealing with arguments that trial counsel had failed
to raise below).
6 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-R, Decision on Motion for Extension of
Time (Dec. 14, 2001); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Decision on the De-
fence's Third Preliminary Motion (May 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Hadfihasanovid, Case No.
IT-01-47-PT, Decision on "Joint Defence Request for Certification of the 'Decision on Mo-
tion for Leave to Amend the Amended Indictment' Dated 18 June 2003" (July 25, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Blagojevid, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Decision on Motion to Seek Leave to Re-
spond to the Prosecution's Final Brief (Sept. 28, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-
05-88/2-PT, Decision on Two Motions Filed 10 January (Jan. 17, 2008); see Ellis, supra note
1, at 958 (discussing prevalence of frivolous arguments).
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sel have been unfamiliar with various aspects of the tribunals' largely adver-
sarial procedure, such as cross-examination.7 Some counsel lack fluency in
the working languages of the court,8 a serious obstacle to legal research and
drafting court filings.
I will not belabor these descriptive points, because these basic problems
have been publicly recognized by many observers of the tribunals, including
scholars,9 a tribunal judge,' 0 a senior prosecutor," and a number of defense
counsel, 2 as well as by official UN investigative reports.'3 Given the rela-
E.g., Julian A. Cook, III, Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 473, 496-99
(2005); Ellis, supra note 1, at 956-58; David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A
Troubled Relationship, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 975, 977 (2003); Developments in the Law: Fair
Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1982, 2000 (2001)
[hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribun-
alfor the Former Yugoslavia Comes ofAge: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of
an International Court, 5 Wash. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 87, 104 (2001) [hereinafter Wald, ICTY];
Anthony D'Amato, Defending a Person Charged with Genocide, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 459, 465
(2000). Even for counsel coming from adversarial systems, Tribunal procedure is likely to
contain many unfamiliar elements, as it is a sui generis hybrid; all counsel may therefore re-
quire Tribunal-specific training. See, e.g., Michail Wladimiroff, Representation and Legal
Aid, Conference Paper presented in The 17th International Conference on the Convergence of
Criminal Justice Systems at The Hague (Aug. 24-28, 2003), at 10, available at
http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Wladimiroff.pdf.
See Patricia M. Wald, Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy, 27
CARDOZO L. REv. 1559, 1572 (2006) [hereinafter Wald, Running the Trial of the Century]
(noting linguistic difficulties of some ICTY counsel); Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judg-
ing: At Home and Abroad, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219, 244 (2004) ("Briefs written by counsel
who were not really comfortable with the operating language-French or English-proved
hard to follow, and the judge often had to work overtime even to understand the argument that
he had to evaluate.").
9 See, e.g., Cook, supra note 7, at 496-501; D'Amato, supra note 7, at 465; Wladimiroff, su-
pro note 7, at 6.
10 See Wald, ICTY, supra note 7, at 104-05.
1 See Tolbert, supra note 7, at 975-77 (referring to defense counsel as "the ICTY's Achilles'
heel" and describing "shockingly poor performances"); cf Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, IT-02-
60-A, Decision on Prosecution's Motion to Extend Word Limit of Consolidated Response
Brief, f 3-4 (Dec. 6, 2005) (observing that the prosecution requested a longer brief respond-
ing to defendants' appeals on the ground that "the appeal briefs of both appellants are unclear
and poorly structured, making it necessary for the Prosecution to provide explanations of its
interpretations of their arguments and of the way the various arguments interrelate").
12 See John E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defence Counsel at the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 167, 170 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001); Michael G. Karnavas,
The International Criminal Tribunal, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1996, available at
http://www.criminaljustice.org/CHAMPION/ARTICLES/96dec01.htm (last visited June 10,
2009); Tracey Wilkinson, Reason to Take On War Crimes Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
1998, at Al (quoting defense counsel).
tively small number of tribunal cases so far, their widely varied circums-
tances, and the difficulty of retrospectively identifying the relative skill le-
vels of different attorneys, it would be difficult to prove empirically that
counsel's performance has changed the ultimate outcomes of tribunal cas-
es. 14 But it is obvious that having incompetent counsel presents a potentially
serious risk to clients' interests, especially in a largely adversarial system
where counsel have primary control over the investigation of cases, the in-
troduction of evidence, and the questioning of witnesses, and where legal ar-
guments can be waived if counsel fails to introduce them at the proper
time.' 5 Moreover, because the problem is widely recognized, it poses a risk
to the perceived fairness of international criminal tribunals, threatening
many of the tribunals' transitional justice aims.'6  Attorney incompetence
costs the tribunals time and money-prosecutors, judges, and codefendants
must grapple with frivolous arguments and motions, while judicial staff are
often left to fill in gaps in the research supporting potentially valid argu-
ments.' 7
13 See Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Investigation Into Possible
Fee-Splitting Arrangements Between Defence Counsel and Indigent Detainees at the ICTR
and ICTY, T 67, U.N. doc A/55/759 [hereinafter UN Fee-Splitting Report] (noting that "de-
lays in proceedings are often caused by counsel who are either inexperienced and/or insuffi-
ciently prepared for trial [or] who engage in frivolous or dilatory conduct"); The Secretary-
General, Comprehensive Report on the Progress Made by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia in Reforming Its Legal Aid System, 54, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/288 (Aug. 12, 2003); Chairman, Report of the Expert Group to
Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
210, delivered to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999).
14 One existing study has attempted to assess the effect of defense attorneys' backgrounds
(i.e., what countries they are trained in) on outcomes for clients at the ICTR, but in my view
that study illustrates the difficulty involved in empirically assessing a system that has in-
cluded very few cases. The quantitative analysis in the paper was based on a sample size of
185 criminal charges; however, those charges were brought against a total of just 20 defen-
dants, meaning the observations were not independent of one another. See James Meernik &
Christopher Farris, The Influence of Attorney Background on Judicial Decision Making at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 89 JUDICATURE 326, 330 (2006).
15 See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing adversarial aspects of tribunal
procedure).
16 See, e.g., Marc Dubuisson et al., Contribution of the Registry to greater respect for the
principles offairness and expeditious proceedings before the International Criminal Court, in
THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 565 (Carsten Stahn &
Gdran Sluiter eds., 2009) ("Justice is credible only when it is efficient, expeditious and fair.").
17 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 958-59; Tolbert, supra note 7, at 979 (noting that incompetence
has led to "delays in the proceedings"); Richard J. Wilson, Assigned Defense Counsel in Do-
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This Symposium article will focus on causes of and solutions to this in-
competence problem, rather than on documenting its magnitude. I first con-
sider why these shortcomings, recognized since the tribunals' early years,
have come to be and been permitted to persist-a somewhat puzzling ques-
tion, given that the tribunals otherwise appear committed to providing fair
trials and have devoted enormous resources to that task. The bulk of the ar-
ticle then addresses potential solutions. While the descriptive aspects of the
piece will focus on the experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTR" and "ICTY," respectively), 8
the ship has sailed for those temporary (albeit rather long-lived) institutions,
which are winding up their operations. Thus, my prescriptive recommenda-
tions are directed at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Because it is
beginning its first trials, the ICC has the opportunity to adopt measures to
avoid repeating the mistakes of ICTR and ICTY, before path dependence
makes effective change more difficult.'9
I. REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM
To an American audience, it may seem unsurprising that tribunal defen-
dants often receive ineffective assistance of counsel. An enormous number
of defendants in U.S. courts face these problems,20 and scholars have raised
mestic and International War Crimes Tribunals: The Need for a Structural Approach, 2 INT'L
CRIM. L. REV. 145, 168 (2002) ("The damaging effects of not providing qualified counsel are
legion . . .. At the ad hoc tribunals, some cases have diverted resources of the Registry into
issues of discipline for alleged misconduct by defense counsel and defendants."); Benjamin
Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications
for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIz. ST. L. REV. 429, 433, 450 (2001) [hereinafter
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?] (discussing the administrative costs triggered by
lawyer incompetence generally); Wald, ICTY, supra note 7.
18 Problems with funding, training, and qualifications of defense counsel have also been ob-
served at the hybrid domestic/international tribunals in Sierra Leone and East Timor. See
Kate Kerr, Note, Fair Trials at International Criminal Tribunals: Examining the Parameters
of the International Right to Counsel, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1227, 1242-44, 1249-50 (2005).
" See Miximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 907-08 (2005) (observing that "policy makers have to be very careful in
choosing what initial model they adopt for international criminal courts and tribunals, . . . be-
cause once a model is adopted and takes root in certain procedural practices, the range of pos-
sibilities for introducing substantial changes to this model is limited"); see also Int'l Criminal
Court (Registry), Report on the Operation of the Court's Legal Aid System and Proposals for
Its Amendment, ICC/ASP/6/4, 1 23 (Nov./Dec. 2007) (noting that the ICC's defense system
is just beginning to operate and that "revision of the existing system" is still possible).
20 E.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
174
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similar criticisms in other domestic systems.21 But the nature and causes of
the problem are quite different in the international setting. Defense counsel
in international tribunals are not particularly overworked. While domestic
counsel are often asked to represent hundreds of defendants single-handedly
each year,2 2 international counsel often spend years working full-time on the
defense of a single client, with the help of co-counsel, legal assistants, in-
terns, and investigators; some also maintain a practice in their home coun-
tries, but others do not.2 3 And although many defense counsel have justifia-
bly complained that funding of defense teams falls considerably short of that
of the prosecution,2 4 the problem cannot fairly be described as solely or even
centrally a matter of resources. The tribunals have spent millions of dollars
per defendant, in considerable part because of a commitment to providing
fair trials. Furthermore, defense counsel today are reasonably well compen-
sated even by Western standards.26 The sources of the problem, then, must
lie elsewhere. In this Section, I consider some possible explanations.
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686 (2007).
21 See, e.g., Marcus Proctor Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of Inef-
fective Assistance of Counsel in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 13
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 318 (2002) (arguing that "what passes for effective assis-
tance of counsel in both the United States and the United Kingdom is baffling.").
22 See Primus, supra note 20, at 683.
23 See Cook, supra note 7, at 496-97 (noting that defense counsel are well compensated and
are "all too willing to spend countless hours with their clients"); UN Fee-Splitting Report,
supra note 13, 7 (describing composition of defense teams); ICTY Office of Legal Aid,
http://www.icty.org/sid/163 (last visited June 10, 2009) (same).
24 See, e.g., Jenia lontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in Internation-
al Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 548 (2008) (citing survey of defense counsel);
Brianne McGonigle, De Facto v. De Jure Equality in the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 13(1) HuM. RTs. BRIEF 10, 13 (2005); Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops,
The Dichotomy between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms Within International and
Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense Perspective, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1566, 1584
(2005) (citing complaints of defense teams).
25 See Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond
Crisis Situations, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1257, 1276 n.97 (2007) (estimating that trials at the
ICTY have cost between $10.9 million and S 15.3 million per defendant).
26 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 952-53 (noting that compensation of counsel has "drastically"
improved since the 1990s, and that as of 2003, "an experienced counsel could earn more than
$230,000 per year"); Sylvia de Bertodano, What Price Defence? Resourcing the Defence at
the ICTY, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 503, 504 (2004) (noting that as of 2004, defense teams at the
ICTY were "paid on an hourly rate estimated at upwards of $360,000 a year"); Developments
in the Law, supra note 7, at 1997 (observing that even the lesser rates paid in the 1990s were
"apparently sufficient to attract numerous European and American attorneys" and were "dis-
proportionately high for attorneys in other parts of the world").
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A. Obstacles to Recruitment and Retention
To the extent that the Tribunals have had trouble attracting a sufficient
number of excellent defense lawyers, the primary problems are working
conditions and unsympathetic clients rather than compensation. Because de-
fense teams work on a contract basis, they lack the job security provided to
prosecution and Chambers attorneys, who are professional-track em-
ployees.2 7 Moreover, defense counsel tend to be less integrated in the tri-
bunal's social community; they are physically housed outside the tribunal
buildings, and some are actually based in other countries. By undermining
quality of life and professional satisfaction, this isolation risks hurting reten-
tion of counsel as well as initial recruitment; it may undermine performance
as well, because defense counsel are less able to build a collaborative com-
munity with institutional memory that may improve the quality of represen-
28tation.
Furthermore, recruitment may be hampered by a comparative lack of
prestige and moral appeal relative to prosecution work, given the nature of
the cases. Domestic criminal defense attorneys are often motivated at least
in part by a desire to protect the individual rights of indigent and vulnerable
clients against the power of the state.29 In the international criminal context,
however, these motivating factors may cut in the other direction, and the
same individuals may be more inclined to work for the prosecution. After
all, the defendants are often powerful government officials accused of com-
mitting serious human rights abuses against civilians. 30
Still, recruitment and retention problems should be surmountable. The
world is full of capable attorneys who are willing to take interesting and
27 See Tolbert, supra note 7, at 982 (noting that ICTY defense counsel are outside contrac-
tors).
28 See Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms ofAttorney Conduct in International Tribunals:
A Case Study ofthe ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 139, 151-52 (2007).
29 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240, 1243 (1993) (noting that "[m]any public
defenders" are initially drawn to defense work by the chance to "fight injustice and help un-
derprivileged citizens" and arguing that defenders may be especially strongly motivated if
they conceive of themselves as "hero[es] taking on a powerful system"); Ian Weinstein,
Teaching Reflective Lawyering in a Small Case Litigation Clinic: A Love Letter to my Clinic,
13 CLINICAL L. REv. 573, 599 (2006) (citing motivations including "that the power of the
state should be constrained and monitored," "challenging the police and prosecutors," and
"empowering the underclass").
30 See McMorrow, supra note 28, at 152-53 (citing a defense attorney's observation that many
participants in international justice do not recognize the "nobility of giving vigorous defense
to people charged with war crimes").
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challenging cases for good money, regardless of their altruistic appeal."
And the tribunals do not have a large caseload. A bar with a few hundred
skilled members, drawn from all across the world, would likely be adequate
to fulfill international defense needs for the foreseeable future.
B. Lack of Hiring Standards
The bigger problem is not that good attorneys are uninterested, but that
the most capable attorneys are not given any particular preference in hiring.
The ICTY and ICTR simply lack an effective filtering mechanism at the ap-
pointment stage.3 2 Hiring is done by an office within the Registry, which
puts together a list of officially qualified counsel from which defendants may
choose.33 Inclusion on the defense counsel list turns essentially on one crite-
rion: admission to practice in good standing in any country.34 The Tribunals
have added a length of practice requirement for defense counsel-now seven
years, including some amount of criminal practice3-and the ICC has
adopted a ten-year minimum. However, this requirement does not ensure
that counsel will have gained relevant experience or skills, and may actually
exclude counsel who do have relevant skills.37 For instance, most ICTR de-
31 See Turner, supra note 24, at 548 (finding that many surveyed counsel were attracted to the
intellectual challenge of Tribunal cases).
32 E.g., Cook, supra note 7, at 496; Tolbert, supra note 7, at 978-79; Ackerman, supra note
12, at 179 (describing the ICTY's requirements as, "perhaps, the least stringent requirements
that could conceivably be imposed").
33 ICTY Office of Legal Aid, http://www.icty.org/sid/163 (last visited June 10, 2009); ICTR ,
Defence Counsel & Detention Management Section,
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/dcdms.htm (last visited June 10, 2009).
34 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 44(A)(i), IT/32/Rev.42 (Nov. 4, 2008) [he-
reinafter ICTY RPE]; see McMorrow, supra note 28, at 154 ("Qualifications to be placed on
the list are relatively low."); Wilson, supra note 17, at 167 (noting that it "appears that the
interest of the Registry is to keep the list open to the widest possible number of available
counsel, but the broad requirements . . . may be insufficient to guarantee qualified counsel").
3s ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 45(A) (March 14, 2008); ICTY Directive on
the Assignment of Defence Counsel, U.N. Doc. IT/73/Rev. I1, Article 14(A)(iv), No. 1/94
(July 11, 2006).
36 See ICC Regulations of the Court, adopted by the judges of the Court on 26 May 2004,
Fifth Plenary Session, ICC-BD-01-01-04, Reg. 67(1), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907-
EOD8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations of the Court_170604EN.pdf.
n Tolbert, supra note 7, at 980; see Michael Greaves, The Right to Counsel before the ICTY
and the ICTR for Indigent Suspects: An Unfettered Right?, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EvIDENCE 177, 179 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that the 10-year minimum
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fense counsel have little experience with international criminal cases.
To illustrate this problem, imagine a general practitioner admitted in
California with ten years' experience, including a number of criminal cases.
Such a lawyer might be perfectly capable in California, but it would be pre-
posterous to assume on this basis alone that she was capable of representing
a criminal defendant in Japan, with its foreign substantive and procedural
law, language, and culture. Generally, domestic bars do not automatically
admit foreign lawyers on the basis of admission to practice and experience in
their home countries. Instead, most domestic bars demand some showing of
competency within the legal system in which the lawyer is seeking to prac-
tice.39 The international criminal tribunals likewise amount to legal systems
that are significantly, or even drastically, different from any domestic sys-
tem, making domestic bar qualifications and practice experience a grossly
inadequate qualification taken alone.40
The paucity of formal requirements for qualification might be a less se-
rious problem if the hiring process were accompanied by serious discretio-
nary review of the quality of counsel's record. For instance, the hiring re-
quirements for Prosecution and Chambers positions are subject to a highly
competitive selection process based on resumes, recommendations, and in-
then in effect excludes "a vast swathe" of qualified potential counsel).
38 Meernik & Farris, supra note 14.
3 Even in the EU, which has liberalized requirements for cross-national practice within Eu-
rope, almost every country imposes an aptitude test on lawyers entering practice from another
E.U. country. The states that do not have such requirement allow a three-year adaptation pe-
riod instead. See Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna Process and Its Impact on Europe: It's So
Much More Than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 107, 149-50 (2008); see also
Wilson, supra note 17, at 167 (noting that many domestic jurisdictions furthermore require
"much more specific criteria for inclusion in lists of assigned counsel [for criminal defen-
dants], such as completion of a training course or continuing legal education, years of practice
... , number of trials, specific types of trials, or demonstrated knowledge in a particular area
of practice."). Indeed, lawyers usually must demonstrate competency anew when moving
among U.S. states, despite the states' highly similar legal systems-although this requirement
has often been criticized as unnecessary and protectionist. Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar
Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 136-37 (2004).
40 See Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation Versus Assignment of Defence Counsel Before
International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 31, 39 (2006) ("The gamut of legal
skills used in ordinary domestic criminal cases is insufficient for the trial of an accused war
criminal. .. . [I]ntemational courts . . . are sui generis, representing a blending of the com-
mon-law and civil-law approaches" and involving particularly intensive trials and complex
fact investigations); Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes
Tribunal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519, 523 (1997)
(noting that "extraordinary" skills are required in order to try Tribunal cases effectively).
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terviews, with most of the more senior positions filled through internal hir-
ing of people who already have Tribunal experience. On the defense side,
however, after the list of qualified counsel is compiled, the Registry has es-
sentially given complete deference to defendants' choice of counsel from
that list. Indeed, one of the reasons for the list's unselective nature appears
to be allowing defendants to choose whomever they want.4 1
Many scholars have suggested that restrictions on entry to the legal pro-
fession in domestic systems sometimes actually harm clients, who would be
benefited by unfettered or at least more open choice-clients could then pay
for exactly the qualifications they want in a lawyer, and not more.4 2 But
such free-market arguments for deregulation (which in any event may be of
limited application to the selection of appointed, court-paid counsel) assume
that clients are at least reasonably capable of assessing the abilities of poten-
tial counsel.4 3 Whatever the merits of this assumption in domestic contexts,
defendants at the international criminal tribunals are ill equipped to choose
wisely or judge the quality of assistance they are receiving after they have
made an initial choice. They have almost no information about potential
counsel, they lack legal training, and most do not speak the languages in
41 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 963 (noting that the Registry will typically add counsel to the list
at a defendant's request).
42 See Frederick Link, Rational Standard Setting in Lawyer Qualification: A Critical Look at
the Proposal of the New York Board of Law Examiners to Increase the Passing Score on the
Bar Examination, 23 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 51, 59-60 (2005); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institu-
tional Analysis ofLawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Leg-
islatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1235-39 (2003) [hereinafter Barton, An Insti-
tutional Analysis] (arguing that a free-market approach would be advantageous to clients, but
that it is ultimately unwise because it would result in the courts being flooded with frivolous
litigation); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 Mo.
L. REV. 299, 304-306 (2004); Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 17, at 436-
441 (2001) (criticizing "the 'incompetent lawyer' justification for regulation" of entry).
43 See, e.g., Barton, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1236 (noting that "a substan-
tial portion of legal services are purchased by savvy entities"); Ribstein, supra note 42, at 306
("Clients have low-cost methods of obtaining reliable information about lawyers without any
regulation, including reputation information from friends and their own past dealings with
lawyers."); see also Link, supra note 42, at 59-60 (acknowledging that the market for legal
services can become distorted when clients are unable to observe lawyer quality accurately,
such that restriction of clients' choices can improve their welfare); Carole Silver, Regulatory
Mismatch in the International Market for Legal Services, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 508-
09 (2003) ("While the concern for protection against incompetence may be relevant to certain
individual clients, sophisticated consumers of legal services are able to protect themselves.");
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 17, at 441 (acknowledging that due to
information problems, "lawyers who represent clients in serious criminal matters or lawyers
who tend to represent less savvy clients, may need to be regulated").
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which the Tribunal operates.4 Also, some defendants have maintained the
unduly cynical belief that they have no chance of prevailing regardless of
whom they choose, or even that appointed counsel may be biased against
them; these defendants have often chosen lawyers they know from home,
even if they have no relevant experience. 4 5 Many of these home-country
counsel have proven to be the least capable.46
To be sure, a good relationship between attorney and client is crucial to
effective representation, so it is important to give defendants a range of
choices. But defendants should not be entitled to choose counsel who are
incapable of representing them with minimum effectiveness. Their choice to
do so is not only self-destructive (usually inadvertently so); it also has se-
rious costs for the tribunal itself in terms of time, money, and credibility, and
it interferes with the tribunal's efforts to create an accurate historical record
through an effective adversarial process. 47 International human rights law
has not generally been interpreted to allow indigent defendants unlimited
choice when it comes to appointed counsel, 48 as the ICTR Appeals Chamber
has recognized; 4 9 in contrast, the right to competent counsel has been treated
as a human right.50  In any event, it should generally be possible to find
counsel who can both relate well to their clients and represent them effec-
44 See Cook, supra note 7, at 501 (noting that defendants do not understand the legal argu-
ments in play).
45 See Bertodano, supra note 26, at 505 (noting that this dynamic was at the heart of the fee-
splitting scandal). This cynicism is undue because the outcome of tribunal proceedings is
hardly foreordained-a simple perusal of the tribunals' results shows that most defendants are
acquitted on some charges and a few on all charges, and many defendants receive rather short
sentences, especially at the ICTY. See ICTY, Cases and Judgments, Indictments and Pro-
ceedings, http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last visited June 10, 2009) (describing disposi-
tion of every ICTY case); ICTR, Status of Cases, http://unictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm
(last visited June 10, 2009) (same for ICTR); see also Turner, supra note 24, at 532 (noting
that "acquittal rates at international criminal trials tend to be somewhat higher than acquittal
rates in domestic proceedings").
46 See Cook, supra note 7, at 498-99; Ellis, supra note 1, at 955-57.
47 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
48 See Little v. Jamaica, Comm. No. 330/1988 (views adopted Apr. 7, 1994); U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D330/1988 (Hum. Rts. Comm. 1994); Ellis, supra note 1, at 962-63 (discussing
European Court of Human Rights case law); Wladimiroff, supra note 7, at 6.
49 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, 61 (June 1, 2001); accord
Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-T/ICTR-96-17-T, Decision on the Mo-
tions of the Accused for Replacement of Counsel, 5 (June 11, 1997).
so Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, % 76-77; see Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The
Right to Assistance of Counsel in Military and War Crimes Tribunals: An International and
Domestic Law Analysis, 14 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 175, 186-88 (2003).
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tively; if, for some reason, this is not possible, perhaps because of a particu-
larly difficult client, tribunals should not simply sacrifice the latter goal. Ra-
ther, as discussed further below, they should attempt to compose multi-
member defense teams that can collectively do both-the "client liaison"
counsel need not necessarily be the lead counsel in charge of the team's writ-
ten work.
C. Lack of Judicial Oversight
Subsequent supervision of counsel has not compensated for problems in
hiring-after counsel's initial appointment, there has been virtually no ad-
ministrative or judicial oversight concerning competence. The Tribunals'
shared Appeals Chamber has held that the appellate standard of review is
11 52
gross incompetence" and that counsel are presumed competent. Further-
more, in the Media Case, the Appeals Chamber recently held that it is the de-
fendant's obligation to object to his own incompetent representation at tri-
al.5 If he fails to raise such an objection until the appeal stage, he must then
prove "that his counsel's incompetence was so manifest as to oblige the Trial
Chamber to act" sua sponte, and that the Trial Chamber's failure to do so oc-
casioned a miscarriage of justice. 54 The Appeals Chamber did not explain
how the non-lawyer defendant is expected to recognize his counsel's failings
at the trial stage, or to identify the appropriate procedural stage to raise an
objection.
Unsurprisingly, these standards have proven difficult to satisfy. De-
fense counsel have occasionally been removed for reasons not directly re-
lated to competence-for instance, due to ethical scandals involving fees or
attempts to influence witnesses.s One ICTR defense attorney was removed
after he was himself indicted by the Rwandan government for genocide-a
reflection, perhaps, of the minimal degree of scrutiny given to counsel before
appointment.5 6 However, it appears that counsel have rarely, if ever, been
5' See Ellis, supra note 1, at 959 (noting that the ICTY has had some success when it has
teamed "a Yugoslav attorney with ... a more seasoned international criminal lawyer").
52 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, 76-77; see Kastenberg, supra note 50, at 206-
07 (critiquing the Appeals Chamber's "unwilling[ness] to 'second-guess' the decisions of trial
defense counsel").
53 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 1 131 (Nov. 28. 2007).
54 id.
5 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 968; Wilson, supra note 17, at 171-73.
56 Rwanda Ex-Lawyer Gets Life [in] Jail for His Role in 1994 Genocide, AFRICA NEWS, Sept.
24, 2008.
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removed due to the poor quality of their work. Although judicial opinions
frequently criticize the defendant's submissions,5 8 and sometimes reprimand
or fine defense counsel for negligence or the filing of frivolous motions,59
the tribunals do not seem to order counsel removed for these reasons.
Appeals on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel have hence
overwhelmingly been rejected, usually because the gross negligence stan-
dard is not met.60 In the Media Case, the Appeals Chamber held that counsel
did commit gross negligence by being absent for various segments of the tri-
al. However, the Chamber found that because the testimony given during
those absences did not affect the verdict, no appellate remedy was neces-
sary.6' The Erdemovic Case was one rare instance in which the defendant
actually received a significant remedy for his attorney's failure-namely, he
was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because neither his attorney (who
was unfamiliar with guilty pleas) nor the court had properly informed him of
its consequences.62 The attorney in question stayed on the case through the
5 No clear instances of such removals are reflected in the publicly available decisions of the
judges or the Registry, although it is possible that some could have taken place confidentially.
In the Halilovic case, the Registry's public decision replacing the defendant's counsel referred
to "available information which seems to put in doubt the quality of the representation." See
Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Con-
cerning Admission of Record of Interview of the Accused from the Bar Table, TT 55-62 (Aug.
19, 2002) (quoting Registry decision and describing counsel's "incompetence"). However, it
is not clear that this represents a case in which counsel was replaced for incompetence. The
replacement actually happened on counsel's own motion, filed on the basis of his health prob-
lems; meanwhile, the accused had also written to the Registry arguing that counsel's work
was compromised by his simultaneous representation of "a large number of clients in Bosnia
and Herzegovina." Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment, Annex 2,
para. 4 & n. 2672 (Nov. 16, 2005).
58 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
5 E.g., Nahimina et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Jean-Bosco Ba-
rayagwiza's Motions for Leave to Submit Additional Grounds of Appeal, to Amend the No-
tice of Appeal and to Correct his Appellant's Brief (Aug. 17, 2006); Prosecutor v. Nyirama-
suhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision on Nyiramasuhuko's motion for Separate
Proceedings, a New Trial, and a Stay of Proceedings (Rules 82(B) and 72(D), Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence) (April 7, 2006); Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talid, Case No. IT-99-36-T, De-
cision on "Request for Certification to Appeal Against the Decision to Separate Trials" and on
"Motion to Extend Time-Limit for Filing Brief in Support of Request for Certification to Ap-
peal" (Oct. 3, 2002); see McMorrow, supra note 28, at 170.
6 See Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment, 1 28 (Oct. 19, 2000);
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Judgment, T 61.
61 Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 139-157 (Nov. 28, 2007).
62 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
Case No. IT-96-22-A, T11 16-18 (Oct. 7, 1997); see also Cook, supra note 7, at 499-501 (citing
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entry of a new guilty plea and the sentencing, but co-counsel was ap-
pointed. 6 3
Why have the tribunals been so reluctant to act on evidence of attorney
incompetence, given the problems incompetence poses for the tribunals' op-
eration and transitional justice objectives? The question requires specula-
tion, and there may be numerous reasons; here, I offer two possible explana-
tions. The first is the high cost of removing counsel or otherwise remedying
incompetence. As I have argued elsewhere, international criminal tribunals'
enforcement of defendants' rights more generally is plagued by the problem
of "remedial deterrence": the infeasibility of available remedies deters tri-
bunals from recognizing rights violations. 64 The tribunals' trials cost mil-
lions of dollars, last for years, and can be traumatic for victim-witnesses-
nobody wants to repeat this process, and starting over after a successful ap-
peal or mistrial is thus essentially a practical impossibility.65 On the other
hand, the tribunals are extremely reluctant simply to release defendants as a
remedy for rights violations-doing so would interfere with their mission of
avoiding impunity for international crimes and risk catastrophic political
backlash.6 6 Given the absence of practical remedies, it is easier for the tri-
bunals to avoid recognizing serious rights violations in the first place, or to
deem them nonprejudicial.6 7
The tribunals' willingness to overlook counsel incompetence or negli-
gence may be a good example of this remedial deterrence phenomenon. In
Erdemovic, because the case involved counsel's advice concerning a guilty
plea, the stakes were comparatively low. The problem of retrying the case
was not presented, as no trial had taken place. Moreover, given the defen-
dant's obvious desire to plead guilty, evidenced by his doing so without be-
the case as an example of attorney incompetence).
63 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-PT, Decision (Dec. 8, 1997) (appointing
co-counsel); Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-PT, Sentencing Judgment, (March
5, 1998) [hereinafter Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment] (listing both original counsel and new
co-counsel).
6 Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in International
Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 695-97 (2008). The term "remedial deterrence" was coined
by the U.S constitutional scholar Daryl Levinson. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884-85 (1999).
65 Starr, supra note 64, at 715-17; see Langer, supra note 19, at 886 (noting that the ICTY
judges have been driven by the need "to expedite the docket, not only to reduce the length of
pre-trial detention, but also to defend the ICTY's legitimacy and international support").
66 Starr, supra note 64, at 717-19 (describing history of the Barayagwiza case and its legacy
for the tribunals).
67 Id. at 720-30.
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ing offered any deal by the prosecution, it was likely that a new guilty plea
would be entered after the addition of new co-counsel.68 But because most
cases are not settled by plea, incompetence might not be recognized until
well into the pretrial or trial process or even after trial. In such cases, re-
placement of counsel would at a minimum cause major delays, financial
costs, and inconvenience for the parties and witnesses. If trial counsel were
to be deemed incompetent on appeal, the entire trial would likely have to be
repeated. Either outcome would seriously embarrass the tribunals and
threaten the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Another possible reason incompetent counsel are tolerated stems from a
clash between common law and civil law approaches, which the tribunals
have famously sought to integrate. Most of the judges (and many Registry
officials) come from civil law systems, 69 in which defense counsel's role,
68 This in fact is what occurred, see Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 63, and it
was fairly predictable, as the defendant had consistently shown a willingness to cooperate,
having turned himself in to the Tribunal before even being investigated, see Nancy Amoury
Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 109-10, 139-41 (2002). Moreover, even if the parties had failed to reach a new
agreement and a trial had been necessitated, this would surely not have been seen as such a
huge loss for the Tribunal as a retrial after a first trial would have been. At the time, plea bar-
gaining was essentially unknown (indeed, quite controversial) at the international level, see
Combs, supra, at 6-7, 139-41; vacating the plea would thus at worst have resulted in a return
to the normal practice of holding a trial.
69 Currently, nine of the sixteen permanent judges at the ICTY come from civil law systems,
and a tenth, Judge Agius, comes from Malta, a blended common law/civil law system. See
ICTY website, The Judges, http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (last visited June 10, 2009) (linking to
biographies of Judges Agius, Kwon (Korea), Antonetti (France), Guney (Turkey), Liu (Chi-
na), Orie (Netherlands), Pocar (Italy), Delvoie (Belgium), and Vaz (Senegal)). Four of the
civil law judges plus Judge Agius sit on the seven-member Appeals Chamber, which also
hears ICTR appeals. See ITCY website, The Assignment of Cases,
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/AssignmentofCases (last visited June 10, 2009). In
addition to the Appeals Chamber judges, four of the seven additional permanent judges at the
ICTR are from civil law systems. See ICTY website, The Chambers,
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/chambers.htm (last visited June 10, 2009) (listing
judges from Norway, Madagascar, Russia, and Sri Lanka). At the ICC, the proportion of civil





EHINT=Guest#b (last visited June 10, 2009) (listing judges from South Korea, Mali, Germa-
ny, Costa Rica, Finland, Latvia, Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Botswana, Belgium, Italy, and Boli-
via).
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while nontrivial, lacks the importance it has in adversarial systems. 70 In an
inquisitorial system, the prosecutor's role is more solicitous of the defen-
dant's interests, providing the defendant with some protection.7 ' Even more
significantly, the judges may see themselves, rather than counsel, as the ul-
timate protector of defendants' rights, capable of filling any gap left by in-
adequate performance by defense counsel.72 Of course, this is not to say that
70 See McMorrow, supra note 28, at 140-43 (discussing differing systems' views of defense
counsel roles and explaining that in civil law systems defense counsel do not cross-examine
witnesses and do not engage in "aggressive fact development"); Langer, supra note 19, at
848-52 (discussing different systems' competing views of judges' and counsels' roles); Craig
M. Bradley, Overview to CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, at xvii-xviii (Craig
M. Bradley ed., Carolina Academic Press 1999) (noting that in civil law systems "[s]ince the
State is theoretically neutral, acting in the best interests of both parties, there is no need for a
defense attorney (though defense attorneys are now required in most countries)").
71 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 70; George C. Thomas Ill, Improving American Justice by
Looking at the World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 791, 816 (2001) (noting that "the reason
[defense] counsel is generally more limited in other countries . . . manifests the trust that other
countries have (or perhaps, had) in systems where [among other things] the prosecutor owed
duties to the defendant").
72 See SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 63
(2003) (arguing that the judges are the "ultimate guardians of justice" and that they therefore
need not assign standby counsel to pro se defendants); Richard S. Frase, Book Review, 39 No.
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 6 (2003) (noting that "central features of the Civil Law model" include "re-
liance on police, prosecutors, and judges rather than defense counsel to gather and present
exculpatory evidence"); Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International
Criminal Tribunals, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 17 (2002) (noting that "if the defen-
dant's counsel fails to raise defenses in a common law trial, the defendant may be forever
barred from raising them; whereas, the civilian court often does (and in some jurisdictions,
may have a duty to) raise and resolve defenses and arguments favorable to the accused"); id.
at 22 (observing that the "non-adversary judge, . . . rather than counsel, is also responsible for
ensuring the best arguments of each party are considered and resolved"); Thomas, supra note
71, at 808-810 (describing relatively passive roles of defense counsel and active roles of
judges in Argentina, France, and Germany); NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN
LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 354 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) ("A judge's role is also to protect the
accused, especially where the accused has no defence."); Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersec-
tion of Two Systems: An American on Trial for Murder in the French Cour d'Assises, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 791, 819 ("It was not easy to convince [a French judge and prosecutor] how
much our system depends on having good defense counsel-the French are so used to relying
on judicial officers."). Mdximo Langer has noted that in the early years of the ICTY, "be-
cause the judges were convinced that the Rules had enacted a predominantly adversarial pro-
cedure, they generally tried to behave according to that system [as passive umpires]-even
those coming from civil law jurisdictions." Langer, supra note 19, at 859-60. However, this
adjustment by civil law judges may not have extended to their conception of the proper role of
defense counsel. Langer further observes that "legal actors with an inquisitorial set of internal
dispositions showed a resistance toward [the active, adversarial] conception of the defense,"
defense incompetence is not a problem when it occurs in a civil law sys-
tem-but it may be less of a problem, which may make judges and Registry
officials more reluctant to take on the costs of remedying incompetence.
Notably, ineffective assistance of counsel does not appear to be an estab-
lished basis for appeal in many civil law countries. As George Thomas has
observed:
The issue [of appellate standards for ineffective assistance] might not
arise in civil law countries. The formal nature of the trial and (at least
until recently) the relatively passive role of defense counsel both be-
fore and during trial would suggest that the question of effective repre-
sentation might not even appear on the radar screen of lawyers and
judges. The physical presence of a lawyer representing the defendant
might satisfy the civil law because the right to counsel is not so central
in the first place.74
There is variation among both common law countries and civil law
countries-for instance, while Canada, Israel, and the United States permit
criminal convictions to be set aside on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, this ground of appeal is essentially unknown in the United Kingdom
and South Africa.75 In any event, whether or not the difference tracks the
common/civil law divide, it is clear that many international judges come
from domestic systems in which judicial oversight of the quality of defense
counsel is limited or absent. Of course, this point should not be overstated
as a causal theory; after all, even courts in common law systems that do in-
corporate appeals for ineffective assistance are often criticized for being too
willing to tolerate incompetence. 7 6 It is nonetheless a possible part of the
with some judges becoming irate at defense counsel whom they perceived as overly aggres-
sive. Id. at 861-62.
n See Thomas, supra note 71, at 813.
74 Id. at 814-15.
75 See id. at 815-16 (reviewing comparative study of criminal procedure by Craig M. Brad-
ley). Many scholars have observed that the United States is an outlier in the degree to which
it expects defense counsel to adopt an adversarial posture. As one scholar has noted, "many
Americans would be shocked by the seemingly docile nature of defense counsel in England,
as well as in most other common law jurisdictions and all civil law nations." Erik Luna, A
Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 277, 313-14 (2004); see also
Thomas, supra note 73, at 807 ("The role of the lawyer in the United States is broader than in
any other country."). Likewise, civil law systems are not uniform; many incorporate aspects
of adversarial procedure. See Frase, supra note 72. And Thomas notes that because of this
shift toward a more adversarial model in some countries, "the civil law view that defense
counsel is unnecessary" may be changing. Thomas, supra note 73, at 817.
76 See supra notes 20-21 (citing scholars discussing the United States).
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explanation for why the problem persists even in tribunals that have ample
money to spend on each case, and that have otherwise committed considera-
ble institutional resources toward the development of fair trial procedures.
Even if judges' expectations are influenced by inquisitorial back-
grounds, the actual trial process in play at the ICTY and ICTR has been gen-
erally adversarial, making defense counsel's role quite important.n Counsel,
and not the court, are principally in charge of calling witnesses, asking ques-
tions, and raising legal objections, which may be deemed waived if not
raised by counsel at the appropriate time. If counsel fails to perform these
tasks effectively, it is unlikely that anyone else will fill in the gap, at least on
a consistent basis.
One partial solution to the incompetence problem might be to shift the
nature of the proceedings toward a truly inquisitorial approach in which de-
fense counsel's role is less central to trial fairness. 7 9 Perhaps this will ulti-
mately happen at the ICC, whose procedures so far reflect somewhat more of
a civil-law influence than do those at the ICTY and ICTR.80 But failure to
n See Kenneth S. Gallant, The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 21, 37-38 (2000) (noting that the ICC Statute
creates a role for defense counsel drawn largely on the common-law model); Combs, supra
note 68, at 70 (noting that although the procedure in the ICTR and ICTY has both adversarial
and inquisitorial features, it is principally adversarial).
78 See Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-A, Judgment, 25-29; Prosecutor v. Simic, Case
No. IT-95-9-A, Judgment, 1 212 (Nov. 28, 2006). In cases involving indictment defects, the
Appeals Chamber has permitted appellants to raise challenges not raised properly below, but
has shifted the burden of proving prejudice in such cases to the appellant; when indictment
defects are raised properly at trial, the prosecution must prove them harmless. See Niyitigeka
v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, 200 (July 9, 2004). In other cases, the
Appeals Chamber sometimes relaxes the waiver doctrine to protect defendants from the fail-
ures of trial counsel, particularly with respect to failure to introduce critical exculpatory evi-
dence; however, new evidence may only be admitted when the appellant shows that trial
counsel was "grossly negligent". See, e.g., Prosecution v. Mejakic et al., Case No. IT-02-65-
ARI I bis 1, Decision on Joint Defense Motion to Admit Additional Evidence Before the Ap-
peals Chamber Pursuant to Rule 115, ' 9 (Nov. 16, 2005); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al.,
Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 60 (Oct. 23, 2001). Even when the Appeals
Chamber adopts a more lenient standard, however, the defendant is still dependent on effec-
tive appellate counsel to point out trial counsel's failures, and is likely to be out of luck if his
trial counsel is still handling his case.
7 See McClelland, supra note 72, at 27 (arguing that equality of arms is hopeless and that the
"best way to ensure some degree of parity. . . is to entrust the acquisition and presentation of
evidence to a neutral entity").
so See Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 263, 273 (2003); Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the Inter-
national Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207
ensure counsel's competence seems like a poor reason for choosing among
procedural frameworks, at least if there are feasible mechanisms for remedy-
ing that failure directly. In any event, whatever procedural role defense
counsel play, as long as the right to counsel exists, it would be much better
to make that right meaningful by ensuring that counsel are capable of doing
their jobs. The next Part accordingly discusses different strategies for doing
so.
II. SOLUTIONS
In this part, I consider scholars' and advocates' existing proposals for
improvement of the defense bar, and offer a new proposal of my own: a sys-
tem of screening and testing potential counsel that centers on a specialized
bar exam in international criminal law. Drawing on scholarship criticizing
existing domestic bar exams, I offer specific suggestions for how such an
exam might be designed to be an effective test of competence.
A. Existing proposals
Little existing scholarship focuses primarily on the incompetence prob-
lem, as opposed to other issues relating to the defense, such as the resources
provided to defense teams,8 ' the right to self-representation, 82 the motiva-
tions of defense counsel,83 and an ethical controversy concerning fee-
splitting that arose at the ICTY in its early years.84 But the scholarship that
does exist has generally proposed one or more of three remedies.
First, scholars and advocates in the early years of the Tribunals put forth
proposals for improving the professionalization of the international defense
bar through the establishment of associations of counsel.85 These proposals
(2009).
81 See generally Knoops, supra note 24; James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethink-
ing Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616 (2005).
82 See generally Scharf, supra note 40; Nina H. B. Jorgensen, The Right of the Accused to
Self-Representation Before International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (2004);
Joanne Williams, Slobodan MiloIevi6 and the Guarantee ofSelf-Representation, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 553 (2007).
83 See Turner, supra note 24.
8 See generally Bertodano, supra note 26; Ellis, supra note 1, at 964-66.
85 E.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 1983, 2002-04; Diane Marie Amann, The
Rights of the Accused in a Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 564-
65 (2000).
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have in substantial part already been adopted-for instance, in 2002, an As-
sociation of Defense Counsel (ADC) was established for the ICTY, at the
request of judges.8 6 Also in 2002, the International Criminal Bar (ICB) was
established, with the objective of becoming "an institutional cornerstone"
that can help to "place the legal profession . . . on a equal footing with the
prosecution and the judiciary" in international criminal proceedings.87  Al-
though the ICB's initial focus is the ICC, it ultimately intends to support de-
fense work at other tribunals, including domestic courts in transitional re-
gimes.88
While it is a step in the right direction, the establishment of the ADC
has not solved the ICTY's incompetence problem, and I think the ICB is
likely to have similar limitations at the ICC. These associations are not se-
lective, have shown no interest in becoming selective, and have no incentive
to impose competence standards that many of their members might fail. 89
Furthermore, membership in the ICB is not mandatory in order to appear be-
fore the ICC.90 And, in any event, the ICB appears to have taken an institu-
tional position against making the requirements for admission to the ICC's
list of qualified counsel more demanding. 91 The primary function of both
86 See Brianne McGonigle, 13(1) HUM. RTs. BRIEF 10, 11 (2005) (describing creation).
87 See Elise Groulx Diggs, Verbatim, THE CHAMPION 44, 46-47 (Nov. 28, 2004) (statement of
the ICB president). Other organizations that preexisted the ADC and ICB include the Interna-
tional Criminal Defense Attorneys Association and the Association des Avocats de la Defense
aupres du Tribunal International pour Rwanda. See also Wilson, supra note 17, at 157.
88 Diggs, supra note 87, at 46.
89 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 969-70 (noting that any current or former ICTY counsel may join
the ADC); International Criminal Bar [hereinafter ICB] Constitution, art. 5(1) (likewise pro-
viding for admission of individuals who qualify to practice before the Court"); see also Tol-
bert, supra note 7, at 985 (noting that if the ADC were empowered to act like a "traditional
domestic bar association" it might fall prey to "cronyism"); McMorrow, supra note 28, at
159-60 (noting that the ADC has rarely disciplined attorneys for any reason); Id. at 157-58
(noting that attorney self-regulation is not effective even in domestic systems like those of the
United States and Yugoslavia, where disbarment is rare); Barton, An Institutional Analysis,
supra note 42, at 1208-09 (arguing that domestic bar associations do a poor job of self-
regulation).
90 See Virginia Lindsay, Exec. Comm. of the ICB, Address at the Fifth Session of the Assem-
bly of States Parties to the Rome Treaty (Nov. 24, 2006) (noting that only one-third of the
ICC's list of counsel and half of those counsel currently assigned to cases are members of the
ICB).
91 Letter from Jeroen Brouwer and Eberhardt Kempf, Presidents of the ICB, to ICC President
Philippe Kirsch and other officials, p. 11 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter ICB Letter], available
at http://217.148.84.127/bpi-icb/files/icb%20position%20pape/o20120906.pdf ("For those
who are qualified to appear on the List of Counsel, there should not be unnecessary barriers to
admission to the List.").
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the ADC and the ICB has been to advocate on behalf of the interests of de-
fendants and the defense bar.9 2 Both the ICB and the ADC have also fo-
cused on the development of professional ethics standards for attorneyS 93 and
on training, 94 and the ADC has suspended at least one member due to an eth-
ical problem.95 It is certainly useful to have organizations playing these
roles, but unless these organizations substantially change their focus or ad-
missions requirements, they will not offer a solution to incompetence.
Second, some scholars and advocates have proposed the creation of a
defense branch within the tribunal, an Office of the Defender, replacing the
current system in which appointed counsel come from outside the Tribunal.9 6
In principle, this proposal is a good idea that could help to improve the
quality of defense. It might help to alleviate recruitment difficulties by im-
proving defense counsel's conditions of employment, providing the benefits
and job security that accompany a career position rather than contract work.
It could help to alleviate the social and professional isolation of defense
counsel, integrating them into a single unit with centralized offices and al-
lowing them to share institutional wisdom with one another. The office
could put in place systems for training new defense counsel, supervising ju-
nior attorneys, and identifying the most qualified junior attorneys to pro-
mote. 9 7 It could have a centralized process for recruiting counsel, consider-
ing applications, making hiring decisions, and appointing particular counsel
to particular cases, rather than delegating those tasks to the Registry, which
is not involved in the actual work of defending cases and which tends to de-
fer excessively to defendants themselves. It could also help to correct two
92 See McMorrow, supra note 28, at 159 (noting that the ADC was created by judges for this
purpose); McGonigle, supra note 24, at 11; see generally ICB Letter, supra note 91 (advocat-
ing on behalf of defense counsel with respect to a number of issues).
93 See Diggs, supra note 87, at 46-47; Code of Conduct and Disciplinary Procedure of the In-
ternational Criminal Bar [hereinafter ICB Code] available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/ICB CodeofConduct.pdf (last visited June 10, 2009). These pro-
fessional standards include a duty of competence, see ICB Code, T 5, but there is so far no
evidence that the ICB intends to give this provision teeth by imposing some form of scrutiny
of attorneys' capabilities and performance.
94 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 971; McGonigle, supra note 24, at 11; ICB Letter, supra note 91,
at 14-15.
95 See Bertodano, supra note 26, at 506.
96 E.g., BARTON LEGUM, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE 261 (2006);
Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 2004-05; Gallant, supra note 77, at 42-44; Int'l
Crim. Def. Attorneys' Ass'n, Ensuring Defence Independence at the ICC, available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/newsreleases/2002mnO24?opendocument; Wilson, supra
note 17, at 176-93.
9 See Gallant, supra note 77, at 42.
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factors that contribute to the perceived and/or actual inequality of arms be-
tween the defense and the prosecution: the fact that the prosecution, but not
the defense, has a structurally central position as an organ of the institution,
and the fact that prosecution and chambers attorneys mostly participate in a
cozy expatriate social community while defense counsel are relatively ex-
cluded.98
Notwithstanding these advantages, the creation of an Office of the De-
fender is almost surely politically infeasible, at least in the near future. Ad-
vocates have unsuccessfully pushed this idea for years. 99 The idea gained
little interest in the ICC negotiations,'00 although the ICC has established an
Office of Public Counsel for the Defence, which does provide some institu-
tional support for defense counsel (who are still outside contractors).o'0 The
proposal also poses potential difficulties related to conflicts of interest that
are more complicated than those facing domestic public defenders' offices;
most of the Court's cases will likely involve large-scale conspiracies or sys-
tems of abuse involving many principal players. Consequently, many of its
defendants are likely to have closely intertwined cases. 0 2 In any event, for
the indefinite future, the Registry will almost certainly remain in charge of
appointing defense counsel, and it is more productive to focus on how the
Registry could improve that process.' 0 3
Moreover, even if an Office of the Defender were created, it would still
be equally important to ask how it should go about identifying and training
qualified counsel. Likewise, even if the professional associations started to
play a more active filtering and competence-monitoring role, it would still be
necessary to ask what standards they should impose. The proposals I sug-
gest below are targeted at the Registry's hiring process, but a similar filtering
98 See Developments in the Law, supra note 7, at 2004 (discussing these advantages).
99 See LEGUM, supra note 96.
100 LEGUM, supra note 96, at 261; Wilson, supra note 17, at 192 ("Resistance to the idea of
independent defense in an international tribunal is strong, as indicated by the response of
states to any such proposal during the drafting of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
proposed ICC.").
101 See The Office of Public Counsel for the Defence, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Defence/Office+of+Public+Counsel+for+the+De
fence/ (last visited June 10, 2009).
102 See Wilson, supra note 17, at 181 (proposing a "mixed model of staff and assigned coun-
sel" to prevent conflicts).
103 See Tolbert, supra note 7, at 985 (arguing that "the Registrar is the only authority in a posi-
tion to protect the public interest" and should "keep firm control over ... issues relating to
qualifications and discipline of defense counsel"); ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 21 (assigning the Registry the role of maintaining the list of qualified counsel).
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process could also be used by these other actors.
Finally, many have advocated more training for defense counsel,10 4 and
some relatively limited training programs have in fact been adopted. 05
Training is certainly a crucial aspect of any plan to improve the quality of
defense, including the one I set forth in the next section, but training alone is
not enough. Training programs can effectively teach discrete skills or in-
formation to otherwise capable attorneys-for instance, teaching adversarial
courtroom procedure to skilled criminal lawyers from civil-law systems.I0 6
But training is unlikely to correct serious linguistic incompetence or a basic
lack of skill in crafting written arguments-or at least, sufficiently extensive
programs would not be an effective use of tribunal resources.107 Finally, un-
less training is linked to enforceable requirements to demonstrate competen-
cy, some counsel probably will not participate, or will not take it seriously.
B. A New Proposal for Improving the Registry's Appointment Process
Tribunals need better administrative and judicial oversight of defense
counsel throughout the trial process, but the most important step in improv-
ing defense counsel performance is undoubtedly hiring better counsel in the
first place. Removing incompetent counsel is a major setback to the
progress of a case and, as noted above, judges and Registry officials are ex-
tremely unlikely to do it. Also, because trials are already so long, further de-
lays to replace counsel would raise serious speedy trial concerns and would
compound the already astronomical cost of international justice. Thus, in-
stead, the solution must come at the front end: better recruiting, better train-
ing, and a more selective appointment process.' 08 In this Section, I develop a
proposal for accomplishing these goals at the ICC.
10 See, e.g., Tolbert, supra note 7, at 980-81; Wilson, supra note 17, at 190-91.
105 See, e.g., ICC to Hold Seventh Seminar of Counsel on 11-12 May 2009, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/74E85D43-6EF4-4BF8-AODB-631 ID65C4BCE.htm (describing short
training program); Annual Report of the Association for Defence Counsel of the ICTY, para.
30, available at http://www.adcicty.org/documents/defence%20annual%20report.pdf (de-
scribing short training program on electronic tools provided, due to a resource shortage, only
to a "limited number of new counsel").
10 See Wald, Running the Trial of the Century, supra note 8, at 1588 (noting that Balkan
counsel have improved at cross-examination with training).
107 See Wald, ICTY, supra note 7, at 104 (noting limits of training).
08 Other observers have suggested that hiring should become more selective, but have not
made specific proposals for how this should be accomplished. See Tolbert, supra note 7, at
980 (noting that "some reasonable criteria should be established[,]" and that attorneys should
"be required to demonstrate competence in criminal law" and to participate in training).
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1. Recruiting
As to recruiting, the ICC should attempt to attract strong candidates by
promoting defense work as an entr6e into, or a means of advancement in, a
broader career track in international criminal law. In applications for prose-
cution, Chambers, and Registry positions, candidates with experience on de-
fense teams should be treated as "internal" candidates for the purpose of hir-
ing preferences, and their defense work should count fully toward
requirements for advancement (or perhaps even be treated more favorably
than other work within the Court). This would help compensate for the lack
of long-term job security in contract-based defense positions, and for the rel-
ative lack of prestige and moral appeal that many candidates likely associate
with defense work.
Moreover, candidates for prosecution, Chambers, and Registry attorney
positions should automatically be considered for defense jobs even if they do
not express an interest--or at least, the default option should be to consider
them for such positions unless they explicitly decline to be considered.
Many qualified candidates that might not have otherwise considered working
on the defense side might do so once an actual job offer was presented to
them, especially if defense counsel were the only job the Court was offering
them. Of course, nobody should be appointed to a defense team unless the
Registry is confident that he or she is committed to put on a zealous defense.
In addition to interviewing counsel candidates to assess their motivation lev-
el, the Registry should help to shape their incentives by informing them that
their work as defense counsel will be regularly evaluated, and that positive
evaluations that show zealous and effective work on the client's behalf will
be a prerequisite not just for continued defense work but also for considera-
tion for other positions within the Court. Moreover, it is crucial that counsel
recruited in this way be able to gain the trust of their clients. Before ap-
pointment to a particular case, potential defense counsel should meet with
their prospective clients to discuss, among other things, the reasons they
want to represent them. While defendants need not be given unfettered
choice of counsel, their confidence in counsel's commitment should play an
important role in assignment.
Notably, it may be easier for the ICC to attract strong candidates than it
has been for the ICTY and ICTR because there is an obvious pool of quali-
fied applicants who might be especially interested: experienced international
criminal law practitioners from non-party states, such as the United States.
Many such lawyers by now have considerable experience from the ad hoc
tribunals but will have a difficult time obtaining ICC staff positions (in
Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, or the Registry) because of the pre-
Ensurinz Defense Counsel Comoetence
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ference for nationals of party states.' 09 The ICC's stated criteria for defense
counsel appointment, in contrast, do not include such a preference."i0 In
general, the coming closure of the ICTY and ICTR will make a large pool of
qualified lawyers from both party and non-party states available when the
ICC will presumably need a material number of defense counsel. The ICC
should aggressively recruit those lawyers to defense positions.
2. Screening and Training Applicants
The ICC should not replicate the ICTY and ICTR Registry's current un-
selective process for appointing defense counsel. A basic first step would be
to assess CVs more rigorously, and there is some evidence that the ICC in-
tends to do this. Its Rules state that counsel must have "established compe-
tence in international or criminal law and procedure" (although the Rules do
not demand competence in both, or in international criminal law specifical-
ly),"' and its website requests that applicants send a "[d]etailed curriculum
vitae, allowing for appraisal of the candidate's competence and expe-
rience."" 2 Moreover, applicants must fill out a form that includes various
questions about their experience and requests self-assessments of their lan-
guage, computer skills, and legal knowledge in various fields." 3 But CV-
based assessment alone is insufficient. Fair assessment of the relative quali-
ties of CVs from all over the world is difficult, and if the Court intends to
maintain a geographically diverse pool of counsel while also ensuring quali-
ty, it needs to create a way for diverse candidates to be compared objectively
and to demonstrate competence in ways other than a background in elite in-
stitutions." 14 Moreover, even successful practice in a domestic system is in-
sufficient to connote competence to practice in the ICC specifically.
109 See International Criminal Court Recruitment,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Recruitment/ (last visited June 10, 2009).
110 See Counsel Authorized to Act Before the Court,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Defence/Counsel/ (last visited
June 10, 2009) (listing qualification requirements).
1 See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 22(1) (emphasis added).
112 See Candidate Application Requirements, http://www.icc-cpi.int/defence/defcounsel.html
(last visited June 10, 2009).
11 Candidate Application Form List of Counsel, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E3C4CC69-6CF 1-4116-8104-
3CCF4011414A/143535/Counsel Form enl.doc (last visited June 10, 2009).
114 See International Criminal Court Recruitment,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Recruitment/ (last visited June 10, 2009) (stating that the
Court aims to achieve "equitable geographical representation for positions in the professional
category").
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Instead, I propose a two-step process for training lawyers and testing
their competence before they start work. First, all potential counsel who are
identified, based on CV assessment, as plausible candidates should be sub-
ject to a detailed written examination that tests the knowledge and skills ne-
cessary to perform written defense work-a bar exam in international crimi-
nal law. Those who pass the bar would then be qualified to file written
submissions at any stage and to serve as appeals counsel, but those who in-
tend to serve as lead or co-counsel at the trial stage would be required, be-
fore trial begins, to go through a second assessment focused on in-court
skills. An intensive training program would be offered before both assess-
ments. Junior lawyers working in supervised positions could be hired before
passage and permitted to begin work, but would be required to pass the next
time the training program and exam are offered (approximately annually).
Although passage could also be required for prosecutors,' 15 judicial staff,
counsel for victims,Il6 or even judges, I focus only on the assessments' utili-
ty in ensuring competent defense in this piece.
Some form of examination is a prerequisite for admission to practice
law in a large number of domestic jurisdictions." 7 However, many scholars
have criticized domestic bar exams, most notably for being poorly suited to
test competence to practice law." 8 The objections scholars have raised are
1' See Tolbert, supra note 7, at 982 (criticizing the lack of required qualifications for prose-
cutors at the ICTY).
116 The ICC, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, offers assigned counsel for victims of international
crimes. See Office of Public Counsel for Victims,
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Victims/Office+of+Public+Counsel+for+Victims
/Office+of+Public+Counsel+for+Victims.htm (last visited June 10, 2009).
1' See, e.g., Charles R. Irish, Reflections of an Observer: The International Conference on
Legal Reform, 24 Wis. INT'L L. J. 5, 15-16 (2006) (discussing bar exams in South Korea, Ja-
pan, and Taiwan); Zhenmin Wang, Legal Education in Contemporary China, 36 INT'L L.
1203, 1210 (2002) (describing Chinese bar exam); Wayne J. Carroll, Liberalization of Na-
tional Legal Admissions Requirements in the European Union: Lessons and Implications, 22
PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 563, 569 n.15 (2003-2004) ("Spain is apparently the only EU Member
State that does not have a state examination requirement for admission to the practice of
law."); Annette Keilmann, The Einheitsjurist: A German Phenomenon, 7 GERMAN L.J. 293
(2007) (describing German system of qualification that includes two separate exams and ap-
prenticeships); CATHERINE ELLIOTr, CATHERINE VERNON & ERIC JEANPIERRE, FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM 255-57 (2d ed. 2006); Richard Parnham, Searching for a True European Lawyer,
2003 EURO. LAw. 25, 28-30 (surveying and summarizing European countries' requirements).
" See, e.g., Irish, supra note 117 (criticizing demanding bar exams in South Korea, Japan,
and Taiwan as testing skills unconnected to legal performance); Rachel L. Gregory, Florida's
Bar Exam: Ensuring Racial Disparity, Not Competence, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 771, 774-
77 (2005) (discussing research showing that "incompetent lawyers can pass bar exams"); Da-
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serious, but none provides a good reason for rejecting testing entirely-
rather, they provide reasons to design a better test of competence."' 9 Here, I
offer some thoughts on how the ICC could do so.
a. Scope
Many critics have argued that the substantive scope of domestic bar ex-
ams fails to correspond to the law that practicing lawyers need to know.120
For instance, commentators in the United States and Germany have written
that bar exams are both over- and under-inclusive, largely because they cov-
er a broad range of subjects, while the practice of law is increasingly specia-
vid B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1946-47 (2005) (arguing that "[a]lthough any argument that such exams
have no relationship to quality would certainly strain credulity... the assumption that bar pas-
sage . . . is synonymous with legal competence has not only never been proven but is, given
what we know about the exam and its history, implausible on its face") (italics omitted); Sally
Simpson & Toni M. Massaro, Students With "CLAS": An Alternative to Traditional Bar Ex-
aminations, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 813, 823-24 (2004); William C. Kidder, 29 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 547, 556 (2004) (arguing that bar exams serve protectionist purposes and "can have
little to no relationship to the real competency requirements needed to promote sound legal
representation"); Larry Ribstein, supra note 42; Barton, An Institutional Analysis, supra note
42, at 1236-37; Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to "Mac-
Crate " Entry to the Legal Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 343, 361 (2003) [hereinafter Glen, Bar
Exam Box] (arguing that because the bar exam tests competency poorly, it is worse than noth-
ing, because it gives clients a "false sense of security"); Society of American Law Teachers
Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDuc. 446, 446-47 (2002) [hereinafter SALT State-
ment]; Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam Should Change,
81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 366, 422 (2002).
119 No test, of course, will be a perfect test of competence; for instance, a lawyer could per-
form well on a test and still lack the commitment, work ethic, or client relation skills to pro-
vide effective representation over the long term. See, e.g., Charles T. Beeching, Jr., A Bar
Examiner's Perspective on Minimum Competence, B. EXAMINER, Nov. 1996, at 6. But a well
designed test can still be a valuable proxy, and can screen out candidates who clearly lack es-
sential skills. See Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, A Response to the Society of American Law
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 442 (2004) (arguing that de-
spite its flaws the U.S. bar exam "serves a necessary function"). Notably, Spain's system,
which is rare in that it lacks a bar exam, has been criticized for producing many very poorly
prepared lawyers. See Peter Joy, How Lawyers Qualify in Europe, 2000 EUR. LAW. 1(5), 60-
61.
120 See, e.g., Linda Jellum & Emmeline Paulette Reeves, Cool Data on a Hot Issue: Empirical
Evidence That a Law School Support Program Enhances Bar Performance, 5 NEv. L.J. 646,
652 nn.39-42 (2005); Christian C. Day, Law Schools Can Solve the "Bar Pass Problem"-
"Do the Work!", 40 CAL. W. L. REv. 321, 331-336 (2004) (arguing that bar exams are neces-
sary).
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lized.121 This problem makes designing a general domestic bar exam that
effectively tests competency a Herculean task. Fortunately, the ICC faces no
such difficulty. A bar exam in international criminal law would be highly
specialized, and thus quite easy to tailor to the substantive knowledge and
skills that international defense counsel specifically need.
The exam should cover, first, the basics of substantive international
criminal law: the elements of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, their
defenses, and modes of individual liability for collective crimes. To that
end, applicants should be expected to be familiar with the substantive provi-
sions of the Rome Statute, the ICC's Elements of Crimes document, the
Court's case law (which at this point is minimal, but will grow), and relevant
precedents from the ICTY and ICTR that are likely to inform the Court, es-
pecially in its early years when it has little jurisprudence of its own to draw
on.12 2 Equally important, the test should cover the ICC's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, the international human rights principles governing the crimi-
nal process, and any practice directives with which counsel will be expected
to comply.123
b. Testing Understanding
Domestic bar exams are often criticized for testing memorization rather
than understanding.12 4 The solution, at least in the international criminal law
context, is simple: the exam should be open-book.12 5 Exam administrators
should furnish some of the materials themselves and set rules for what else
can be brought. All test-takers should be provided at the very least with cop-
ies of the most essential ICC documents-in particular, the Rome Statute,
the Elements of Crimes, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the Code
121 See, e.g., Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 362-65; SALT Statement, supra note
118, at 448; Keilmann, supra note 117, at 302-06 ("[T]he state exams require students to mas-
ter far too much material. The huge number of laws, it is argued, calls for specialization.").
122 See Starr, supra note 25, at 1267 (discussing ICTY/ICTR influence on ICC); see also Wil-
son, supra note 17, at 167 (noting that "knowledge of international humanitarian law seems
indispensable, and general knowledge of the statutes, rules, and ever-growing jurisprudence
of the tribunals are sine qua non for appearance there.").
123 See Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 17, at 459-60 (criticizing the U.S.
bar exam for focusing "almost exclusively on substantive legal issues and 'thinking like a
lawyer' and dedicat[ing] little, if any, space to the specifics of practice before courts").
124 See, e.g., Irish, supra note 117, at 16 (discussing South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan); SALT
Statement, supra note 118, at 447; Curcio, supra note 118, at 374-77.
125 See Curcio, supra note 118, at 374 (noting that closed-book format drives test-takers to
focus on memorization).
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of Professional Conduct12 6-and they could be provided with additional le-
gal materials that are relevant to the questions they are asked: international
court decisions, ICC Preparatory Commission materials, excerpts from the
leading treatises, and so forth. They can then be tested on their ability to
identify germane points in those materials and use them to support a legal
argument in a hypothetical case.
c. Testing Writing and Legal Analysis Skills
Probably the most important lawyering skills for defense counsel are the
ability to analyze the application of a legal principle to a particular situation
and to communicate that analysis in writing. Defense counsel must employ
these skills again and again at all stages of the proceedings. Written bar ex-
ams in the U.S. have proven fairly effective at testing these skills,127 So it
should not be difficult to ensure that the ICC exam does the same, simply by
including essay questions involving the analysis of challenging fact situa-
tions or procedural predicaments. Many of the most universal criticisms of
the U.S. bar exams have targeted the use of multiple-choice questions, which
(while they may have some utility in broadening the substantive coverage of
a multisubject exam 2 8) do not test legal methods that correspond closely to
those actually employed by practicing lawyers.' 2 9 Multiple-choice questions
simply should not be used on an ICC exam.
d. Testing Language Skills
One of the most common problems in defense counsel submissions is
linguistic incompetency: some counsel who claim to be proficient in English
or French actually are not.' 30 This problem no doubt hampers such counsels'
126 See International Criminal Court, Basic Legal Texts,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/ (linking to key documents) (last
visited June 17, 2009).
127 See, e.g., Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 376; Kristin Booth Glen, When and
Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696,
1712 (2002) [hereinafter Glen, Rethinking Admission]; Darrow-Kleinhaus, supra note 119, at
442-46.
128 See Day, supra note 120, at 337, 339.
129 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 118, at 1950; SALT Statement, supra note 118, at 447-48
("No practicing lawyer is faced with the need to apply a memorized legal principle to a set of
facts she has never seen before and then choose, in 1.8 minutes, the "most correct" of four
given answers.").
130 See Wald, Reflections on Judging: At Home and Abroad, supra note 8. The Tribunals'
procedural rules generally require counsel to be fluent in French or English, although they
allow waiver of this requirement in "the interests of justice." See ICTY RPE, supra note 34,
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research ability, and makes their written submissions difficult or even im-
possible to understand. One possible response would be to require counsel
to pass, at a high level, a proficiency exam in English or French, such as the
one administered by the UN.13  But if a bar exam were established, a sepa-
rate competency exam would not be necessary, because the bar exam would
offer something better: the ability to test would-be counsel's ability to use
English or French to write persuasive essays about international criminal
law. That is, requiring counsel to take the bar in English or French would
test the exact language skills that counsel have to use in practice.
To be sure, counsel who speak the language of the accused but do not
speak English or French may still play a valuable role on ICC defense teams
(particularly if it proves impossible to recruit enough multilingual lawyers
who can do both).132 Communication with the accused is crucial, and it may
be easier to build a relationship of trust if that communication can happen
without an interpreter. Still, as long as the case law and other relevant mate-
rials are limited to English and French, counsel that lack proficiency in these
languages should not be appointed to lead counsel roles. Legal research is
too central to the lead counsel's task to be delegated to interpreters, and
while legal assistants may help with research, lead counsel must be able to
read primary materials so as to be able to evaluate and make use of his assis-
tants' work product.'3 3 The problem could be solved by the use of differing
qualification requirements for different members of the defense team. An
alternative method of certifying competence, focused on interpersonal skills
and not necessarily requiring mastery of English or French, might be de-
signed for specialized defense team members whose principal role would be
to communicate directly with the client. 134
e. Testing Relevant Research Skills
International defense counsel work requires the ability to do legal re-
at Rule 44(a)(2).
131 See United Nations, Language Proficiency Examinations,
http://www.un.org/exam/lpe/welcome/main.asp (last visited June 10, 2009) (describing ex-
ams).
132 See Wald, Running the Trial of the Century, supra note 8, at 1578 (noting that the ICTY
has sometimes waived the language qualification requirement for counsel "because ICTY de-
fendants wanted counsel who spoke their Balkan dialect").
33 Legal Education & Admission to the Bar, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, in LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 138 (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992).
134 Subsection g, infra, offers some ideas for how interpersonal skills could be tested.
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search-and specifically, mastery of the particular court's electronic re-
search tools. Although domestic bar exams often omit this skill, there is no
reason it cannot be tested on a bar exam, and it should be.'3 5 As part of the
exam, test-takers could be given one or two research projects that counsel
could reasonably be expected to complete in a half or full day-for instance,
drafting an urgent motion for provisional release based on a family medical
emergency. To preserve exam security, test-takers should be given comput-
ers with Internet access that is confined to the online databases that they will
use regularly as counsel, such as the judicial records databases of the
ICTY' 36 and ICTR'37 and the ICC's "Legal Tools" electronic library, which
currently consists of 25,000 legal documents and commentaries on interna-
tional criminal law.'38
f. Allowing Plenty of Time
Bar examinations in the United States cram a large number of questions
into a short amount of time. Scholars have criticized this characteristic on
two grounds. First, it prizes speed over thoughtfulness and care and thus en-
courages hasty and sloppy lawyering, while not corresponding to anything
lawyers actually need to do in practice. 139 Second, it may contribute to the
bar exam's lower passage rate for racial minority groups, because of a psy-
chological phenomenon known as "stereotype threat." 4 0 In high-stakes test-
ing situations involving tight time constraints, studies have suggested that
13 See Glen, Rethinking Admission supra note 127, at 1711 (criticizing U.S. bar exam on this
ground); Curcio, supra note 118, at 371, 411 (same).
136 See ICTY Court Records Online Database, http://icr.icty.org/default.aspx (last visited June
10, 2009).
137 See ICC Legal Texts and Tools, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Legal+Tools/ (last visited June 10, 2009).
1 See id.(describing this database). See also Curcio, supra note 118, at 395 (noting that U.S.
professional licensing exams in architecture are computer-based and provide test-takers with
access to reference materials); id. at 396-97 (suggesting that if bar takers were provided with
Internet access or a CD-ROM with legal materials, it would be possible "to completely elimi-
nate the current 'memorize the law' model").
139 See Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 475-76, 508; Curcio, supra note 118, at 375
(noting that "relying on one's memory rather than on one's research of the law may lead to
Rule 11 sanctions or malpractice liability").
140 See Jane E. Cross, The Bar Examination in Black and White: The Black-White Bar Pas-
sage Gap and the Implications for Minority Admissions to the Legal Profession, 18 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 63, 96-98 (2004-2005); Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 473-474; Claude
M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically
Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401, 423 (Christopher
Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., Brookings Inst. Press 1998).
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stereotypes-social expectations that certain groups will perform more poor-
ly-may be self-fulfilling prophecies. The "stereotype threat" theory holds
that minorities as well as women, aware of those stereotypes, second-guess
their own answers unnecessarily and thus take too long to progress through
the questions, ultimately running short of time.141
The first of these two concerns is equally applicable in the international
criminal justice contexts, and the second may well be.142 In addition, time-
pressured exams would be certain to disparately impact fluent but non-native
speakers of English and French, who can be expected to conduct research
and writing a bit more slowly than native speakers. A slight disadvantage
with respect to speed ought not to be taken to suggest that such lawyers can-
not operate effectively as counsel, so long as their ultimate work product is
excellent, and it would be counterproductive to exclude otherwise strong
candidates for this reason. To avoid these problems, the exam should be
spread out over multiple days, and on each day test-takers should be given
plentiful time to complete the material.
g. Testing Oral Communication and Courtroom Skills
One of the most pervasive criticisms of ICTY and ICTR counsel has
been that they lack the necessary courtroom skills, especially with cross-
examination.143 Counsel who wish to perform these tasks at trial should be
trained in and tested on adversary courtroom procedure. In addition, lead
trial counsel (or team members whose role especially focuses on client rela-
tions, as mentioned above) must also have the interpersonal skills necessary
to counsel their clients and to seek their input into their defense strategy.
While these skills may seem difficult to test on a bar examination, critics of
U.S. bar examinations (which are wholly written) have developed some pro-
posals that are worth considering.144  Courtroom skills could be tested
141 Cross, supra note 140, at 97-98; Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 473-75, 508;
Steele & Aronson, supra note 140.
142 The ICB has already suggested that women are underrepresented in the existing list of ICC
counsel. ICB Letter, supra note 91, at 11.
143 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
144 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Grosberg, Standardized Clients: A Possible Improvement for the
Bar Exam, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 841, 841-44 [hereinafter Grosberg, Standardized Clients]
(2004); Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 346 ("proposing an experiential, perfor-
mance-based alternative bar exam"); SALT Statement, supra note 118, at 451 (proposing con-
sideration of a "practical-skills teaching term" modeled on a Canadian approach, which would
include "assessments[] in interviewing, advocacy, legal writing, and legal drafting skills");
Curcio, supra note 118, at 394-96 (noting that computer-based simulations could provide a
practical means of administering skills testing); id. at 414 (discussing use of actors as "stan-
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through exercises involving actors as mock witnesses and judges, while
client counseling skills could be tested through the use of mock clients.
Similar forms of testing are in effect in U.S. medical education and board
qualification, where the use of actors as standardized mock patients is rou-
tine,145 and there have been some U.S. experiments with use of such methods
in the legal context.146 In Germany, oral examinations including "case pres-
entations" are required of every entering lawyer.14 7 Likewise, in France and
in Italy candidates who pass initial written exams must then complete oral
assessments; these are mostly focused on substantive law.' 4 8  In Britain,
would-be barristers undergo assessments of advocacy skills, such as han-
dling of witnesses, as part of a training program called the Bar Vocational
Course.149
For two reasons, however, I propose that oral testing not be required
of all defense counsel, but rather be separated into a second stage required
only of counsel already admitted to the ICC bar who now seek to be ap-
pointed as lead or co-counsel in a particular case at the trial stage. First,
such assessments are likely to be significantly more cost- and time-intensive
than a written exam, and they are simply not necessary for all counsel. Ju-
nior lawyers on a defense team need not examine witnesses and are unlikely
to play a principal role in consulting clients, while appellate counsel's tasks
are overwhelmingly centered on legal research and writing. And it is cer-
tainly not necessary to administer the oral test to those who do not pass the
written portion of the exam; separating the two stages would allow that
group to be screened out.so
dardized clients").
145 Grosberg, Standardized Clients, supra note 144, at 842; Lawrence M. Grosberg, Medical
Education Again Provides a Model for Law Schools: The Standardized Patient Becomes the
Standardized Client, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212 (2001).
146 E.g., Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note 118, at 409-10; Grosberg, Standardized Clients, su-
pra note 144, at 852-62.
147 NIGEL G. FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 85 (3d ed., Oxford Un-
iv. Press 2002); see Keilmann, supra note 117, at 295.
148 ELLIOTT ET AL., supra note 117, at 257 (discussing France); Allessandro Barzaghi, The
Italian Bar Exam, SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (2007), available at
http://www.scu.edu/scjil/global/BarzaghiArticleItalianBar.shtml (discussing Italy).
149 Marcus Soanes, Flexible Paradigms and Slim Course Design: Initiating a Professional
Approach to Learning Advocacy Skills, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 179, 182-85 (1998).
o50 Cf Jayne W. Barnard & Mark Greenspan, Incremental Bar Admission: Lessons from the
Medical Profession, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 340, 341 (2003) (arguing that approaching profes-
sional licensing incrementally, via separate stages of testing, allows early identification of
"candidates who are unlikely to achieve licensure, thus limiting their financial and emotional
exposure.").
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Second, oral and thus non-blind examinations create the opportunity to
introduce any number of unconscious (or conscious) biases. Studies in a
wide variety of professional contexts have shown the persistence of gender
and racial discrimination in hiring and performance assessment even in
countries, like the United States, where such discrimination is squarely illeg-
al and socially disapproved.' 5' Blind assessment methods-like screened
auditions for orchestras-have proven in some contexts to significantly re-
duce that discrimination.' 52 In my view, this evidence is sufficient to justify
blind-grading written examinations and avoiding oral testing except where it
is really necessary-as it certainly is for lead trial counsel, given the ad hoc
tribunals' problems with poor courtroom skills. When carrying out oral test-
ing, every effort should be made to reduce possible bias. For instance, very
specific performance criteria should be developed ahead of time; the evaluat-
ing committee should reflect the Court's diversity, in addition to being them-
selves experienced and well-respected international criminal lawyers; and
the evaluation process should itself be monitored to ensure that consistent
standards are being applied.
In terms of evaluating interactions with clients, coming up with a "stan-
dard" client may be especially difficult in the international context, of
course, because of cultural differences. Perhaps counsel could be exposed to
several different mock clients representing a variety of different personality
and cultural profiles that are representative of the diversity of defendants to
which ICC counsel might be assigned. Alternatively, rather than using a
completely standardized set of mock clients for all applicants, counsel seek-
ing appointment to specific cases could be tested using mock clients whose
profiles are designed to approximate those of the particular defendants
whom counsel are seeking to represent. Or part of the appointment process
151 See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Confronting the "Sacred and Unchangeable ": The Obligation
to Modify Cultural Patterns Under the Women's Discrimination Treaty, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
585, 601-05 (2008) (discussing discrimination against women in the labor market internation-
ally and in the United States); Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Dis-
crimination: Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L.
347, 356 & n.21 (2008) (citing studies); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination 3 (June 2004) (working paper), available at http://
post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/papers/emilygreg.pdf, David Neumark et.
al, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, Ill Q. J. ECON. 915 (1996).
152 See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 715, 736-38 (2000); Ian Weinstein, Test-
ing Multiple Intelligences: Comparing Evaluation by Simulation and Written Exam, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 282-83 (2001) (finding tentative evidence that blind law school grad-
ing reduced unconscious bias against women).
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could involve observation of counsel's actual initial interaction with the
client she is seeking to represent. Because the defendant would be involved
in choosing his own lawyer and could observe his communication skills di-
rectly, testing client communication skills may be a less crucial aspect of the
oral testing proposal than testing courtroom skills, which would not normal-
ly be observed until long after counsel's initial assignment to the case.
h. Training for the Test
The purpose of a bar exam requirement should not be exclusivity for its
own sake, as it appears to be in some domestic systems. 53 A high pass rate
should be the goal, so as to ensure a plentiful supply of qualified defense
counsel, but this should be achieved through effective training rather than
dilution of standards.
I envision a full-time training course of about three weeks prior to the
written bar exam, offered free to qualified applicants being considered for
appointment to counsel positions, or to junior lawyers already working in
supervised positions. Candidates facing substantial hardship could be given
additional stipends for their travel and time, which would help to mitigate
the disparate impact on lawyers from poor countries, and the course could
possibly be offered in a virtual-classroom setting to reduce costs. I think that
for any experienced lawyer who already had the necessary competence in
English or French writing and basic legal analysis skills, three weeks of
classes and study time would be enough time to cover the core material,
even though it obviously could not cover every nuance. For comparison,
U.S. bar review courses cover a dozen or more fields of law in eight or ten
weeks.154 An additional training course of perhaps a week or so would be
offered for those lawyers taking the second-stage trial skills test. Neither
training course would be mandatory; candidates who are truly already quali-
fied to practice at the Court should have no difficulty passing the exam with-
153 Bar exams in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have particularly been criticized on this
ground; with pass rates between two and ten percent, they are often described as simply
means of protecting existing lawyers from competition. See Irish, supra note 117, at 17-18;
see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law's Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites
in Japan, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451, 459-60 (2003) (arguing that the extremely diffi-
cult Japanese bar exam has produced a scarcity of lawyers); Glen, Bar Exam Box, supra note
118, at 373-74 (discussing arguments that the U.S. bar is a "profoundly anticompetitive .
'guild restriction').
154 See, e.g., BARBRI website, Course Information: New York,
http://www.barbri.com/app.aspx?cmd=brc_CourseLocations&state=NY (last visited June 10,
2009) (listing schedule).
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out taking the training, meaning that for such candidates, satisfying the exam
requirement would require no more of an investment than the few days re-
quired to take the test itself.
Providing this training in international criminal law would have the co-
rollary benefit of helping to train a corps of lawyers who could later return to
their home systems with familiarity with this body of law, even if they do
not end up practicing in the ICC. This could help to serve the ICC's broader
objectives of encouraging domestic legal systems to institute effective sys-
tems for fairly trying and punishing international crimes.'55 Moreover, qual-
ified candidates could be attracted to defense positions precisely because of
the availability of the free training program and the value of bar certification
itself in obtaining jobs at home or elsewhere in the international community.
Bar exams are never particularly popular requirements, and are often ar-
duous, and one plausible objection to adding such a requirement at the ICC
is that it could deter some qualified counsel from applying. However, the
possible career advantages brought by certification and training could coun-
teract this risk, such that the bar requirement need not worsen recruitment
problems and could possibly help to alleviate them.
i. Continuing Education
Because the ICC is new, its case law is likely to evolve rapidly. Practic-
ing counsel should thus be required, at appropriate intervals following their
bar admission (perhaps every two years), to participate in brief training pro-
grams focused on recent changes in the law. Counsel would also be ex-
pected, of course, to track changes in the law on an ongoing basis as part of
their professional duty of competence, but providing continuing education
could help to make sure that counsel do not miss any important develop-
ments. These training programs could include testing on the new material,
but such a test could be much more limited in scope and duration than the
initial bar exam. Continuing education and/or retesting requirements could
be heightened for counsel who have a break of many years in their practice
of international criminal law, or who do not practice for many years follow-
ing their initial bar certification but later seek appointment to a case. 5 6
1ss See, e.g., David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 1281, 1293-94 (2009) (describing the ICC's ability to "assist[] states in bringing their judi-
cial systems up to a standard where they can prosecute crimes under the ICC Statute" as "the
key question for international criminal law" that will determine whether "the ICC is to make a
broader impact than simply holding a limited number of trials in The Hague").
156 Likewise, counsel who seek to practice in a language that they have not actively used in
many years could be asked to take a screening test for continued linguistic competence.
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j. Funding
This proposal will no doubt be expensive at the outset. But these costs
must be put in perspective: international criminal trials are unbelievably ex-
pensive. The ICTY has averaged around $10 million to $15 million per de-
fendant.'57 Investing in more skilled counsel at the outset might help to save
costs in the long run, because incompetent counsel cost tribunals money by
filing frivolous motions and forcing judicial staff to fill in research gaps to
support potentially valid arguments.'58 And in any event, given that the in-
ternational community has decided that it is worth spending these kinds of
sums to run these trials, then it would be worth spending a little more to try
to increase their fairness.
CONCLUSION
The too-frequent problem of defense counsel incompetence has been
widely recognized since the early days of the modem international criminal
tribunals, and it is important that the ICC take steps now to avoid replicating
that problem. New testing requirements, like those I have proposed here, are
rarely popular with those who have to comply with them, and they also im-
pose costs and design challenges on those who must administer them. Yet it
is worth taking on these costs-or at least, worth investing in some other se-
rious strategy for ensuring competency of counsel-lest the fairness and cre-
dibility of the young Court's proceedings be undermined.
157 See Starr, supra note 25.
158 See Henderson, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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